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AB 32 IS A BAN: CALIFORNIA TAKES THE RIGHT
APPROACH BUT MUST STILL TAKE FURTHER
ACTION AGAINST FOR-PROFIT CORPORATIONS
IN OUR PRISON SYSTEM
Jonathan Barrera*
In 2019, California passed Assembly Bill 32, which is described as
an outright ban on the use of private prisons in the state. However, the
bill has several exceptions that apply to the ban, and some of these exceptions are not well defined in scope or applicability. In fact, there are
commentators who have criticized the law for perceived expansive loopholes to the ban due to these exceptions. As the law is relatively new,
courts have not had a chance to interpret the scope or applicability of
these exceptions. This Note argues that despite the vagueness of Assembly Bill 32’s exceptions, California enacted a true ban because (1) the
legislative history of Assembly Bill 32 makes it clear that the exceptions
were not meant to be applied broadly, and (2) California courts have
held that language in statutes should not be read in a manner that would
contradict the legislative intent behind the passing of the statutes. In addition, this Note argues that California must expand the scope of the private prison ban if the state, as it claims, truly wants to end the exploitation of inmates by for-profit private corporations.

* Associate, Reed Smith. J.D., May 2021, Loyola Law School, Los Angeles; B.A. in Sociology, California State Northridge, May 2017. Thank you to Professor Kevin Lapp for his support
and guidance on this Note. I would also like to thank all the staff and editors of the Loyola of Los
Angeles Law Review for their hard work in making this article possible. Most importantly, thank
you to my mother for all her sacrifices and hard work, nothing I have done would have been possible without her support.
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I. INTRODUCTION
In 2021, a new president took office, and with this change in administration came vows for various changes and reforms.1 President
Joseph R. Biden made several promises as to how he will govern.2 One
of his promises is to end the federal government’s reliance on private
prisons.3 President Biden has already, through executive order, taken
some action on this promise by directing the Department of Justice
(DOJ) to cease entering into new contracts with private prisons and
preventing the renewal of current contracts.4
Furthermore, some states have also taken steps to reduce their reliance on private prisons.5 For example, New York, a state that has
already banned the use of private prisons,6 recently proposed a law
banning state-chartered banking institutions from investing in and
providing financing for private prisons.7 In 2019, the law passed the
state Senate, but failed to pass the state Assembly.8 However, at the
start of 2021, the state Senate took the initial steps needed to reintroduce and pass the bill.9 Some commentators view this action as historic because it would make New York the first state in the country to
completely ban state-sponsored private prison financing.10
California has also recently taken steps to cease its reliance on
private prisons.11 In 2019, California passed Assembly Bill 32 (“AB
1. Gregory Korte, Biden’s Promises for Day One Could Take Months to Fulfill, BLOOMBERG
(Jan. 14, 2021, 11:00 PM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2021-01-15/biden-promises
-for-day-one-could-take-months-to-fulfill [https://perma.cc/X527-NENC].
2. Id.
3. Lauren-Brooke Eisen, Breaking Down Biden’s Order to Eliminate DOJ Private Prison
Contracts, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUST., (Aug. 27, 2021), https://www.brennancenter.org/ourwork/research-reports/breaking-down-bidens-order-eliminate-doj-private-prison-contracts
[https://perma.cc/AKG9-R6K2].
4. Id.
5. Catherine Kim, Private Prisons Face an Uncertain Future as States Turn Their Backs on
the Industry, VOX (Dec. 1, 2019, 3:53 PM), https://www.vox.com/policy-and-politics/2019/12/
1/20989336/private-prisons-states-bans-califonia-nevada-colorado [https://perma.cc/822D-337G].
6. N.Y. CORRECT. LAW § 121 (McKinney 2021).
7. Morgan Simon, New York Takes Next Historic Step Away from Private Prisons, FORBES
(Feb. 13, 2020, 12:52 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/morgansimon/2020/02/13/new-yorktakes-next-historic-step-away-from-private-prisons/ [https://perma.cc/5PML-HG8T].
8. Id.
9. Ryan Tarinelli, NY Lawmakers Advance Bill to Stem Private Prison Investment, N.Y.L.J.
(Jan. 26, 2021, 1:23 PM), https://www.law.com/newyorklawjournal/2021/01/26/ny-lawmakers-ad
vance-bill-to-stem-private-prison-investment/ [https://perma.cc/8C3N-VYED].
10. Simon, supra note 7.
11. Alexei Koseff, California Bans Private Prisons and Immigration Detention Centers, S.F.
CHRON. (Oct. 11, 2019, 5:03 PM), https://www.sfchronicle.com/politics/article/California-willstop-using-private-prisons-by-14515257.php [https://perma.cc/F8QK-8Z44].
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32”), which prevents the state of California from entering into new
contracts with private prisons and prevents the state from renewing
existing contracts with private prisons.12 California also banned the
operation of privately run federal immigration detention centers,
which has set the state up for a first of its kind legal battle over the
federal government’s right to regulate federal detention centers.13
On its surface, AB 32 appears to be a complete ban on private
prisons. After all, both California Governor Gavin Newsom (“Governor Newsom”) and Assemblymember Rob Bonta (“Assemblymember
Bonta”), the author of AB 32, claim that AB 32 ends California’s use
of all private prisons in California.14 However, some commentators
have expressed concerns over the exceptions listed in AB 32.15 In fact,
these commentators argue that some of these exceptions are so broad
that they raise the question of whether California’s private prison is
truly a real ban.16 This Note proposes, for reasons that will be explained below, that California did well in deciding to take an unequivocable stance against the use of private prisons at both the state and
federal level. Furthermore, this Note also discusses the scope of the
exceptions to the private prison ban listed in AB 32 in order to evaluate
the veracity of the claims that there are “specific carve-outs that will
allow private prison companies to continue to do business in California.”17 However, regardless of the scope of AB 32’s exceptions, it is
12. Id.
13. Id. Technically, Illinois passed the first bill banning the operation of federal immigration
detention centers, but unlike California, the federal government does not currently have any federal
immigration facilities in Illinois. Sophia Tareen, Advocates Hope Illinois Private Detention Ban
Sparks Change, AP NEWS (July 13, 2019), https://apnews.com/article/d6ec44532d9840a3a7455
b47a6540b07 [https://perma.cc/G6LZ-CWDW]. For an understanding of the legal dispute between
the federal government and California, see GEO Grp., Inc. v. Newsom, 493 F. Supp. 3d 905 (S.D.
Cal. 2020).
14. Governor Newsom Signs AB 32 to Halt Private, For-Profit Prisons and Immigration Detention Facilities in California, OFF. OF GOVERNOR GAVIN NEWSOM (Oct. 11, 2019) [hereinafter
Governor Newsom Signs AB 32], https://www.gov.ca.gov/2019/10/11/governor-newsom-signs-ab32-to-halt-private-for-profit-prisons-and-immigration-detention-facilities-in-california/
[https://perma.cc/6Y5W-LRWP].
15. Chandra Bozelko & Ryan Lo, California’s Private Prison Ban Isn’t a Ban at All, ORANGE
CNTY. REG. (Oct. 20, 2019, 8:45 PM), https://www.ocregister.com/2019/10/20/californias-privateprison-ban-isnt-a-ban-at-all/; see also Edward Lyon, California Begins Weaning Itself from Private
Prisons—More or Less, PRISON LEGAL NEWS (Feb. 4, 2020), https://www.prisonlegalnews.org/
news/2020/feb/4/california-begins-weaning-itself-private-prisons-more-or-less/ [https://perma.cc/
8QDM-K24V] (noting that a distinction in AB 32, of whether the federal government itself can
continue to operate privately-owned prisons, will have to be resolved in court because it may provide several loopholes for private companies to continue operating detention centers).
16. Bozelko & Lo, supra note 15.
17. Id.
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important to realize that AB 32 only addresses part of the issue of private for-profit companies making profit off of California’s prison system. To that end, this Note argues that California must take further
action if it truly wishes to end the financial exploitation of inmates by
private for-profit companies.
The Note is organized as follows: Part I explains the historical
circumstances that led to the rise of private prisons in the United
States, with an emphasis on California; Part II discusses how private
prisons operate, the findings on the treatment of inmates in these facilities, and how the state and federal government and U.S. companies
have responded to these findings; Part III looks at the language used
in AB 32 and discuss the different ways in which courts can interpret
the exceptions to the private prison ban; and Part IV discusses why
California’s prison ban is necessary and discusses the next steps California must take to end the financial exploitation of the state’s inmates
by private for-profit companies.
II. BACKGROUND
Today, the operation of private prisons is a multibillion-dollar industry—$5 billion to be specific.18 The first private prison opened up
in Tennessee in 1984, during the midst of the War on Drugs.19 The
prison was permitted in order to accommodate the overwhelming
number of people that were being convicted at the time.20 The number
of people being arrested was so great that a federal judge in Tennessee
ordered the state to stop admitting people to prison due to the severe
overcrowding in the prisons.21 Thus, private companies began to claim
that they could design and construct facilities that could hold more
prisoners while requiring less staff, which in turn would reduce costs
for the state.22 Thus, to states like Tennessee, which was under a federal mandate to reduce the severe overcrowding of its prisons,23 there
was a strong appeal towards private prison use. In fact, similar trends

18. The Private Prison Industry, Explained, THE WEEK (Aug. 6, 2018), https://
theweek.com/articles/788226/private-prison-industry-explained [https://perma.cc/D9BH-NVXR].
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. Id.
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occurred throughout the United States with incarceration rates rising
and the private prison industry promising to have the solution.24
A. The Federal Impact
During the War on Drugs, the private prison industry grew rapidly.25 During the 1980s and ’90s, the majority of the U.S. population
was very afraid of what it perceived as rising crime rates throughout
the nation.26 Drugs were blamed for the rise in crimes rates, and drug
convictions increased almost tenfold from 1980 to 1996 as a result.27
State and federal legislators responded by enacting “increasingly harsh
sentencing laws.”28 People serving longer sentences served a key role
in the need for more prison beds throughout the country.29 However,
there was a second, equally important factor in play as well, which
was “a sharp increase in the tendency of prosecutors to ask for prison
sentences.”30 During this timeframe, arrests increased in high numbers, with state incarceration rates increasing by 148 percent.31 Between 1982 and 1998, the state and federal prison population went
from approximately 400,000 to over 1 million people.32 Overall, a
scared U.S. population coupled with responsive legislators led to the
passing and enforcement of some of the strictest criminal laws that the
country had ever passed.33
For example, beginning in the 1980s, two harsh drug sentencing
laws were passed.34 According to some commentators, the laws were

24. andré douglas pond cummings & Adam Lamparello, Private Prisons and the New Marketplace for Crime, 6 WAKE FOREST J.L. & POL’Y 407, 415 (2016).
25. See JAMES AUSTIN & GARRY COVENTRY, BUREAU OF JUST. ASSISTANCE, NCJ No.
181249,
EMERGING
ISSUES
ON
PRIVATIZED
PRISONS
iii,
1
(2001),
https://www.ojp.gov/pdffiles1/bja/181249.pdf [https://perma.cc/FC8K-FA27].
26. See RUTH WILSON GILMORE, GOLDEN GULAG: PRISONS, SURPLUS, CRISIS, AND
OPPOSITION IN GLOBALIZING CALIFORNIA 17–18 (2007).
27. Shima Baradaran, Drugs and Violence, 88 S. CAL. L. REV. 227, 229–30 (2015).
28. Carl Takei, From Mass Incarceration to Mass Control, and Back Again: How Bipartisan
Criminal Justice Reform May Lead to a For-Profit Nightmare, 20 U. PA. J.L. & SOC. CHANGE 125,
131 (2017).
29. Robert Weisberg, The Wild West of Sentencing Reform: Lessons from California, 48
CRIME & JUST. 35, 58 (2019).
30. Id.
31. Heather Schoenfeld, The War on Drugs, the Politics of Crime, and Mass Incarceration in
the United States, 15 J. GENDER, RACE & JUST. 315, 322–23 (2012).
32. German Lopez, Why You Can’t Blame Mass Incarceration on the War on Drugs, VOX
(May 30, 2017, 9:00 AM), https://www.vox.com/policy-and-politics/2017/5/30/15591700/massincarceration-john-pfaff-locked-in.
33. See Takei, supra note 28, at 130–31.
34. Baradaran, supra note 27, at 249.
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passed in response to a belief that drug use was a direct link to increases in violence throughout the country.35 The perception of the
U.S. population at the time was that drug use was one of the most prolific issues in the nation.36 Therefore, in 1986, President Ronald
Reagan signed the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986 (ADAA), which continued with a then-precedent of establishing mandatory minimum sentences for certain drug crimes.37 Before the passage of the ADAA,
judges had discretion on the length of the sentence to impose on drug
offenses.38 However, the ADAA took this discretion away and imposed five and ten year minimums for possessing certain quantities of
a selected group of drugs.39 In addition, second time offenders could
have their sentences doubled.40
Another example of legislation that passed in response to perceived threats of crime is the 1994 Crime Bill, signed into law by President Bill Clinton.41 This bill also continued the then-trend of creating
more mandatory minimum sentences.42 Just like the ADAA, the 1994
Crime Bill was passed over a perceived threat of rising crime rates.43
Social scientists like James A. Fox, a criminologist, warned of “a
blood bath of violence” that would occur across the country.44 Moreover, there was a belief that there was a wave of youth that was devoid
of impulse control and remorse, and that these youths’ numbers were
“ready to explode cataclysmically.”45 It was believed that these youths
would overrun society and commit unprecedented acts of violence, a

35. Id. at 229–30.
36. See id. at 248. Notably, during the time frame in which these mandatory minimum sentencing laws were being passed, drug use was already decreasing. Id. at 249 n.136. The 1980’s
media was instrumental in framing the perception that drug use was a national crisis, with the issue
receiving constant airtime. Id. at 250. Sensational media and a scared U.S. population made it easy
to pass laws targeting drug use. See id. at 249–50. Even U.S. Congress members, despite statistics
showing the contrary, pushed the narrative that drug use was a national crisis by sharing stories of
murders in which drug use was a factor. Id. at 251.
37. Id. at 249.
38. Michael A. Simons, Departing Ways: Uniformity, Disparity and Cooperation in Federal
Drug Sentences, 47 VILL. L. REV. 921, 929–30 (2002).
39. Id. at 930.
40. Id.
41. Takei, supra note 28, at 155–56.
42. Id. at 156.
43. Id. at 155–56.
44. Clyde Haberman, When Youth Violence Spurred ‘Superpredator’ Fear, N.Y. TIMES
(Apr. 6, 2014), https://www.nytimes.com/2014/04/07/us/politics/killing-on-bus-recalls-superpredator-threat-of-90s.html [https://perma.cc/T8YS-2Z83].
45. Id.
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concept which was known as the Superpredator Theory.46 The 1994
Crime Bill was prepared to combat this by “dramatically” increasing
the mandatory sentences and authorizing billions of dollars in funding
for new prisons.47 One of the new sentences added was the “threestrikes-you’re-out” provision, which mandated a life sentence for defendants who were convicted of a federal offense and had two prior
qualifying state or federal court convictions.48
Overall, due to the 1994 Crime Bill, the ADAA, and other harsh
sentencing legislation, by the year 2000, the Justice Policy Institute
estimated that the United States incarcerated more people in the 1990s
than in any other decade in the country’s history.49
B. California’s Impact
In the midst of this perceived national crisis, California began
passing laws that led to historically high incarceration rates in the
state, which peaked in 2006.50 California’s trend towards a tough-oncrime approach can be traced back to the passing of the 1977 Uniform
Deterrence Sentencing Act (“the Act”),51 which stated that “[t]he purpose of imprisonment for crime is punishment.”52 The Act also directed the California Department of Corrections (CDCR) to forecast
future prison bed needs,53 which made it clear California was ready to
start imprisoning many more people than it had up to that point and
for much longer sentences.54 Two of California’s tough-on-crime laws
that fueled higher incarceration rates during the 1980s and 1990s were
the Street Terrorism Enforcement and Prevention Act (STEP Act),
46. Id. Notably, between 1994 and 2011, violent crimes committed by youths aged 10 to 17
fell by approximately two thirds. Id. This decline in violence by youths sparked debate among
experts for the reasoning behind the decrease, but the 1994 Crime Bill does not appear to be one of
the primary reasons given for the decline. Id. Even the political scientist from Princeton who championed the theory, John J. DiIulio Jr., admitted that this perceived threat was plainly wrong. Elizabeth Becker, As Ex-Theorist on Young ‘Superpredators,’ Bush Aide Has Regrets, N.Y. TIMES
(Feb. 9, 2001), https://www.nytimes.com/2001/02/09/us/as-ex-theorist-on-young-superpredatorsbush-aide-has-regrets.html [https://perma.cc/GJL4-XQXT].
47. Takei, supra note 28, at 156.
48. Margaret P. Spencer, Sentencing Drug Offenders: The Incarceration Addiction, 40 VILL.
L. REV. 335, 351–52 (1995).
49. Takei, supra note 28, at 156.
50. Magnus Lofstrom & Brandon Martin, How California Reduced Its Prison Population,
PUB. POL’Y INST. OF CAL. (Feb. 6, 2015), https://www.ppic.org/blog/how-california-reduced-itsprison-population/ [https://perma.cc/C2NL-LYPU].
51. GILMORE, supra note 26, at 91.
52. Id.
53. Id. at 91–92.
54. Id. at 89–91.
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which was passed in 1988, and Proposition 184, which was passed in
1994.55
1. The STEP Act
In 1988, California became the first state in the country to adopt
anti-gang legislation with the passing of the STEP Act, legislation intended to increase prosecutors’ ability to prosecute gang activity.56
However, the STEP Act did much more than just that. The STEP Act
also increased the penalties for ordinary felonies committed by gang
members.57 For example, most felonies categorized as “serious” felonies carry a maximum sentence of three years or less, but that same
offense, if gang related, receives an additional five-year enhancement.58 Some of these enhancements were lengthy, such as the enhancement for witness intimidation that goes from a maximum penalty
of three-years to life imprisonment when the offense is found to be
gang related.59 Furthermore, Penal Code section 186.22 of the STEP
Act has two provisions, criminalizing active participation in a criminal
street gang and enhancements for committing crimes that benefit or
promote criminal street gangs, that can be prosecuted simultaneously.60 The effect was that a defendant could receive two strikes
counting towards California’s three strike law in one proceeding.61
Despite these efforts by the California Legislature to combat
criminal street gangs, the number of criminal street gangs increased
from 600 in 1988, the year the STEP Act was passed, to 6,642 by
2010.62 Yet, as the number of gangs continued to grow, instead of
seeking alternate solutions to combat gang membership, the California
Legislature instead kept increasing the punishments associated with
the STEP Act.63 In March 2000, in response to the Superpredator Theory, Proposition 21, which enhanced criminal punishments under the
55. Id. at 5–7.
56. Samuel DiPietro, Comment, STEPping into the “Wrong” Neighborhood: A Critique of
the People v. Albillar’s Expansion of California Penal Code Section 186.22(a) and a Call to Reexamine the Treatment of Gang Affiliation, 110 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 623, 626 (2020).
57. Martin Baker, Stuck in the Thicket: Struggling with Interpretation and Application of California’s Anti-Gang STEP Act, 11 BERKELEY J. CRIM. L. 101, 104–05 (2006).
58. Id. at 105.
59. Id.
60. DiPietro, supra note 56, at 628.
61. Id.
62. Id. at 653.
63. See Sara Lynn Van Hofwegen, Note, Unjust and Ineffective: A Critical Look at California’s STEP Act, 18 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 679, 681 (2009).
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STEP Act, was passed.64 In addition, the California Supreme Court
lowered the burden of proof required to prosecute people under the
STEP Act. In People v. Castenada,65 the California Supreme Court
held that defendants could be convicted under the STEP Act’s provision for gang association for any degree of involvement above “nominal or passive” participation.66 Prior to this standard, case law precedent held that defendants needed to demonstrate substantial
involvement in and devotion to a criminal street gang.67
Another provision of the STEP Act stated that a defendant
charged under the STEP Act needed to be aware that the gang had
previously committed two statutorily-defined extremely serious offenses.68 Thus, a defendant could be charged under the STEP Act for
actions committed after their gang’s members commit two predicate
acts.69 Yet in People v. Gardeley,70 the California Supreme Court held
that a defendant could be charged under the STEP Act simultaneously
with the second predicate act that is required to be charged under the
STEP Act.71
These amendments and appellate opinions significantly broadened the STEP Act and increased its severity.72 The overall effect being that prosecutors were able to punish more people and keep them
in prison for longer periods of time.73
2. Proposition 184
However, before the STEP Act, there was another piece of legislation passed that greatly affected how California sentenced defendants. In 1994, California citizens passed Proposition 184 (“Prop.
184”), the three strikes law.74 This law is viewed as the culmination of

64. See Robert L. v. Superior Ct., 109 Cal. Rptr. 2d 716, 719–21 (Ct. App. 2001) (discussing
how Proposition 21 was “designed to overhaul the juvenile justice system and crackdown on juvenile offenders”).
65. 3 P.3d 278 (Cal. 2000).
66. Baker, supra note 57, at 109–10.
67. Id. at 109.
68. Id. at 114.
69. Id. at 115.
70. 927 P.2d 713 (Cal. 1996).
71. Baker, supra note 57, at 115–16 (arguing that the California Supreme Court’s holding that
the second predicate act could be charged simultaneously with the STEP Act’s penalties was a clear
violation of the legislative intent of the STEP Act).
72. Id. at 102.
73. See id. at 114–15.
74. Joshua Kleinfeld, Two Cultures of Punishment, 68 STAN. L. REV. 933, 976 (2016).

(9) 55.1_BARRERA_V10.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

2022]

AB 32 IS A BAN

2/4/22 1:46 PM

155

over a decade of tough-on-crime legislation.75 As originally enacted,
the proposition called for the mandatory imposition of a twenty-fiveyears-to-life sentence if a defendant committed any felony so long as
the defendant had two previous “serious” or “violent” felony convictions.76 However, the law contained many other provisions. For example, it required the doubling of any sentence associated with a felony
conviction if the defendant had a prior serious or violent felony conviction.77 In addition, courts were required to sentence defendants to
consecutive rather than concurrent sentences in some instances.78
According to at least one commentator, the law led to “astonishing sentences.”79 For example, a defendant who shoplifted golf clubs
and had never been convicted of an act of violence received a life without parole sentence under Prop. 184.80 In another case, a defendant
who had never been convicted of an act of violence shoplifted videotapes and received a fifty-years-to-life sentence for that offense.81
Both sentences were upheld when challenged.82
Additionally, under Prop. 184, it was possible for a defendant,
depending on the order of their criminal history, to receive drastically
different sentences even if they committed the exact same offenses.83
This was possible because, if a defendant had two prior felonies where
only one was a serious or violent felony and was now facing a second
serious or violent felony conviction, they would not get a life sentence.84 On the other hand, if the defendant had two prior felonies that
were serious or violent but was now facing a felony that was not serious or violent, they would get a life sentence.85 This means that the
latter would get a harsher sentence despite a criminal history that is
decreasing in severity, while the former would get a much more lenient sentence even though their criminal activity was increasing in

75. Michael Vitiello, Three Strikes: Can We Return to Rationality?, 87 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 395, 395 (1997).
76. Kleinfeld, supra note 74, at 976.
77. Vitiello, supra note 75, at 406–07.
78. Id. at 404.
79. Kleinfeld, supra note 74, at 976.
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. Cole F. Heyer, Note, Comparing the Strike Zones of “Three Strikes and You’re Out” Laws
for California and Georgia, the Nation’s Two Heaviest Hitters, 45 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 1217,
1233–34 (2012).
84. Id.
85. Id. at 1234.
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severity.86 Thus, the three-strikes law was heavily reliant on the sequences of the crimes committed as opposed to the actual crimes themselves, which meant that people could get lengthy incarceration sentences for actions that, if committed before Prop. 184, would have
resulted in a shorter prison sentence.87 Therefore, it is not difficult to
see how California came to require so many additional prison beds as
Prop. 184 was making it possible to give life without parole sentences
to crimes that traditionally had much lower prison sentences attached
to them.
3. The Effects
What were the results of all these tough-on-crime measures? At
the national level, the size of the private prison population grew 90
percent, going from 69,000 prisoners in 1999 to 131,000 in 2014.88
Part of the reason for this rise in private prison reliance was due to the
sheer amount of people that were being arrested.89 For example, during President Clinton’s two presidential terms alone, the total population of federal and state prisons rose by 673,000.90 In 1985, the prison
population was approximately 740,000, but by 2003 that number had
risen to over 2.1 million.91 The growth of private prisons mirrors this
growth in the prison population. In 1996, thirteen states housed their
prisoners in private prisons.92 However, by 2004, thirty-four states
housed their inmates in private prisons.93
The numbers only continued to grow. From 2000 to 2011, the
number of federal prisoners in private facilities increased almost 150
percent, and the number of state prisoners in private facilities increased by approximately 23 percent.94 To put these numbers in perspective, CoreCivic, by 2014, controlled 92,500 prison beds across 67

86. Id.
87. Id.
88. Cynthia Elaine Tompkins, Private Prisons: Profiting from, and Contributing to, Mass Incarceration, 8 L.J. SOC. JUST. 1, 19 (2017).
89. Id. at 17.
90. Id. at 15–16.
91. Sharon Dolovich, State Punishment and Private Prisons, 55 DUKE L.J. 437, 455 (2005).
92. James F. Blumstein et al., Do Government Agencies Respond to Market Pressures? Evidence from Private Prisons, 15 VA. J. SOC. POL’Y & L. 446, 454 (2008).
93. Id.
94. Mike Tartaglia, Note, Private Prisons, Private Records, 94 B.U. L. REV. 1689, 1695
(2014).

(9) 55.1_BARRERA_V10.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

2022]

AB 32 IS A BAN

2/4/22 1:46 PM

157

prisons.95 That same year, GEO Group controlled 61,000 prison beds
across 56 facilities.96 It is estimated that private prisons housed more
than 8 percent of the nation’s prisoners in 2014.97 While the number
seems small, this translates to billions of dollars in profits for the private prison corporations.98
In California, between 1982 and 2000, despite the crime rate
peaking in 1980, the California state prisoner population grew nearly
500 percent.99 Additionally, since 1984, California built twenty-three
major new prisons, with each costing between $280 and $350 million.100 The cause of California’s mass incarceration was a combination of lengthy prison sentences and an increase in the amount of people being prosecuted.101
The rise in incarceration rates in California eventually led to
Brown v. Plata,102 a Supreme Court of the United States case. In Plata,
the Supreme Court made several findings about California’s prisons.
For example, the Court noted that at its peak, California prisons held
156,000 inmates, an amount nearly double the capacity that the prisons
were designed to hold, which was 80,000.103 The Court further found
that California’s prisons were run at nearly double the capacity for at
least eleven years prior to 2011.104 Before the case reached the Supreme Court, a three-judge federal panel ordered California to reduce
its prison population to 137.5 percent of design capacity, which meant
that California had to release 46,000 inmates.105 Yet, by the time the
case got to the Supreme Court, only 9,000 inmates had been released,
meaning the state still had to figure out the release of 37,000 inmates.106 The Court noted that “[f]or years the medical and mental
health care provided by California’s prisons has fallen short of minimum constitutional requirements and has failed to meet prisoners’

95. Id.; CORECIVIC, INC., FORM 10-K: ANNUAL REPORT PURSUANT TO SECTION 13 OR 15(D)
OF THE SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT OF 1934, at 5 (Feb. 23, 2017), https://www.sec.gov/Archives/
edgar/data/1070985/000119312517053982/d310578d10k.htm [https://perma.cc/WG5L-MBUR].
96. Tartaglia, supra note 94, at 1695.
97. Id.
98. Id. at 1695–96.
99. GILMORE, supra note 26, at 7.
100. Id.
101. Weisberg, supra note 29, at 57–59.
102. 563 U.S. 493 (2011).
103. Id. at 501–02.
104. Id. at 502.
105. Id. at 501.
106. Id.

(9) 55.1_BARRERA_V10.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

158

LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW

2/4/22 1:46 PM

[Vol. 55:145

basic health needs.”107 The Court also noted that “these serious constitutional violations” amounted to the well-documented “[n]eedless
suffering and death” of inmates without an adequate solution to the
issue.108
In a failed effort to address its overcrowding prisons, California,
in 2006, entered into a contract between the California Department of
Corrections and the private prison corporations GEO Group Inc. and
CoreCivic, formerly known as Correctional Corporation of America.109 This contract allowed California to send inmates to out-of-state
private prisons in four other states.110 The CDCR stated that at its peak,
its prison population consisted of more than 172,000 inmates.111 It also
noted that over 17,000 inmates were forced to live in areas not designed to be living spaces, such as gymnasiums and dayrooms.112
Thus, by 2010, there were more than 10,400 inmates held in out-ofstate private facilities due to overcrowding.113 This almost certainly
led to many inmates being cut off from visits from their loved ones, a
severe concern considering that even top correction officials suggest
that communication between inmates and their loved ones contributes
to their rehabilitation.114 In addition, “[t]he CDCR was [CoreCivic’s]
only state partner that accounted for 10% or more of [CoreCivic’s]
total revenue” in recent years,115 showing how much California came
to rely on private prisons.

107. Id.
108. Id.
109. CDCR Signs Contracts to House Inmates Out-of-State, CAL. DEP’T. OF CORR. & REHAB.
(Oct. 20, 2006), https://web.archive.org/web/20200829233839/https:/www.cdcr.ca.gov/news/20
06/10/20/cdcr-signs-contracts-to-house-inmates-out-of-state; CORECIVIC, INC., supra note 95, at 5.
110. CDCR Signs Contracts to House Inmates Out-of-State, supra note 109.
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation Exits Last Out-of-State Prison,
CAL. DEP’T. OF CORR. & REHAB. (June 25, 2019), https://www.cdcr.ca.gov/news/2019/06/25/
california-department-of-corrections-and-rehabilitation-exits-last-out-of-state-prison
[https://perma.cc/YY7Y-5G5E].
114. See Alex Friedmann, Apples-to-Fish: Public and Private Prison Cost Comparisons, 42
FORDHAM URB. L.J. 503, 548 (2014).
115. CORECIVIC, INC., supra note 95, at 11.
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III. HOW PRIVATE PRISONS OPERATE
A. Financial Incentives
The end goal of private prisons is to maximize profits for shareholders while minimizing expenses.116 Private prisons make money by
housing inmates for state governments, which pay these corporations
via government contracts.117 Typically, the amount of profit gained by
private prisons is directly dependent on the number of people incarcerated in them.118 Thus, the goal is to maintain inmates for less money
than the amount the government pays these companies to house the
inmates.119 Therefore, in order for private prisons to maximize their
profits, they need to keep their beds filled with inmates.120 The result
being that the prisons require a constant stream of inmates to replace
the prisoners who have finished serving their sentences.121 Thus, the
rehabilitation of inmates, which involves reducing recidivism and
lowering incarceration rates, is problematic for private prisons that are
paid based on the number of inmates they house.122 Furthermore, as
for-profit institutions, private prisons are incentivized to provide the
bare minimum of service to inmates as required by law.123 After all,
providing anything more than that would cut into the profits of shareholders. This necessarily raises the question of whether we can expect
private prisons to offer the most effective services aimed at reducing
recidivism.
Private prisons have promoted themselves with the argument that
they can house inmates for states at lower costs than it would cost the
state itself to house the inmates.124 However, some studies conducted
on comparing the costs to maintain inmates in public versus private
prisons have found little to no savings.125 For example, the state of
116. Tompkins, supra note 88, at 5.
117. Dolovich, supra note 91, at 460, 473 n.129.
118. Id. at 533.
119. Id. at 460.
120. Id. at 533.
121. See id. at 518.
122. See Tompkins, supra note 88, at 21.
123. See id. at 5.
124. Dolovich, supra note 91, at 457.
125. See, e.g., Audit: Private Prisons Cost More Than State-Run Prisons, AP NEWS (Jan. 1,
2019), https://apnews.com/article/af7177d9cce540ab9f2d873b99437154 [https://perma.cc/G8XUX9WW]; Liberty Vittert, The Cold Hard Facts About America’s Private Prison System, FOX NEWS
(Dec. 19, 2018), https://www.foxnews.com/opinion/the-cold-hard-facts-about-americas-privateprison-system [https://perma.cc/V9MJ-LV35]; cummings & Lamparello, supra note 24, at 423–24.
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Arizona conducted a study where it “found that their minimum-security public and private prisons cost virtually the same amount per prisoner.”126 Notably, a separate study conducted by Temple University
found savings of approximately 14 percent for Arizona’s privately-run
minimum security prisons.127 However, it was later discovered that the
funding for the latter study came from three major private prison companies that used this study as evidence that their facilities are more
affordable.128 Thus, measuring the actual cost savings of private prisons is problematic because the source of the funding for the study can
sometimes be biased.
Furthermore, there are issues involving the accuracy of the studies in assessing the actual cost-saving benefits private prisons offer. In
California, a facility operated by the GEO Group was investigated, and
one study said the savings were only 3 percent while the other study
said the savings were 15 percent.129 Thus, it is difficult to get an accurate measure of the savings that private prisons provide over their public counterparts, if any, due to the difficulties in establishing a universal metric to compare public and private prisons. However, at least
some studies suggest the savings provided are not there.
Thus, there are legitimate reasons to be concerned with the prevailing approach to funding private prisons. Even alternate methods of
funding, such as leasing a facility to a public agency to use and operate, contain similar incentives like quotas or requiring full payment
per bed even if the beds are empty.130 For example, in Arizona, the
private prison company Management & Training Corp. (MTC) threatened to sue the state of Arizona over a contractual obligation between
the two parties that stated that Arizona had to keep MTC’s prison beds
at 97 percent capacity.131 Eventually, Arizona had to pay MTC $3 million because Arizona was not arresting enough people to keep MTC’s
prison beds full.132

126. Megan Mumford et al., The Economics of Private Prisons, BROOKINGS INST.: HAMILTON
PROJECT 4 (Oct. 20, 2006), https://www.hamiltonproject.org/assets/files/economics_of_private_prisons.pdf [https://perma.cc/6XTM-XA6X].
127. Id. at 4.
128. Id.
129. The Private Prison Industry, Explained, supra note 18.
130. Bozelko & Lo, supra note 15.
131. Chris Kirkham, Prison Quotas Push Lawmakers to Fill Beds, Derail Reform,
HUFFINGTON POST (Sept. 20, 2013, 9:14 PM), https://www.huffingtonpost.co.uk/entry/privateprison-quotas_n_3953483 [https://perma.cc/J9SC-UMU9].
132. See id.

(9) 55.1_BARRERA_V10.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

2022]

AB 32 IS A BAN

2/4/22 1:46 PM

161

Thus, given the current modes of paying private prisons, there is
either an incentive for private prisons to keep their beds full, or in other
cases, states end up paying private prisons because there are not
enough prisoners to house.
B. Findings as to the Faults in Private Prisons
However, even if the economic argument is conceded, there are
still various other issues to be concerned about. A 2016 report by the
DOJ found that privately run prisons had higher incidences of contraband, violence, and excessive use of force than publicly-run federal
prisons.133 For example, the report found that assaults by inmates on
other inmates and assaults by inmates on staff members were more
common in private prisons.134 Furthermore, the report also indicated
that much more contraband was making its way into private prisons
than publicly-run prisons.135 Notably, this was the case despite the fact
that private prisons tend to house mostly non-violent offenders.136
Overall, the report found that private prisons had more safety and security-related incidents per capita than publicly-run federal prisons.137
These findings only increase the legitimacy of the arguments that private prisons are not well-staffed, which of course goes back to the issue of maximizing profits. Because of these findings, the DOJ ordered
that all contracts with private prisons be rejected for renewal or have
their scope substantially limited.138
Then, in 2019, the Office of Inspector General found significant
health violations in a private immigration detention facility in California and in two other private immigration detention centers in other
states, all of which are owned by GEO Group.139 In the GEO-owned
private prisons, inmates were being provided improper uniforms, were
133. Kim, supra note 5.
134. OFF. OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., REVIEW OF THE FEDERAL BUREAU OF PRISONS’
MONITORING OF CONTRACT PRISONS 18 (2016), https://oig.justice.gov/reports/2016/e1606.pdf
[https://perma.cc/2JFJ-BX8R].
135. Id. at 14, 15.
136. AUSTIN & COVENTRY, supra note 25, at ix.
137. OFF. OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., supra note 134, at 14.
138. Matt Zapotosky & Chico Harlan, Justice Department Says It Will End Use of Private Prisons, WASH. POST (Aug. 18, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/post-nation/wp/
2016/08/18/justice-department-says-it-will-end-use-of-private-prisons/ [https://perma.cc/6SKP4NUK].
139. OFF. OF INSPECTOR GEN., CONCERNS ABOUT ICE DETAINEE TREATMENT AND CARE AT
FOUR DETENTION FACILITIES 2–3 (2019), https://www.oig.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/assets/201906/OIG-19-47-Jun19.pdf [https://perma.cc/4DTC-59H6].
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not provided hygiene products, and were forced to use shower stalls
and bathrooms that contained mold, mildew, and peeling paint.140 The
mold found in the California facility was a significant health hazard
for detainees.141 Furthermore, the bathrooms were in non-working order.142 Overall, the Department of Homeland Security Office of Inspector General found that the detention center had “egregious violations.”143
Thus, even if private prisons do offer housing at a lower cost,
which is a disputed claim, findings like the ones mentioned above
show the risks involved with a system where maximizing profits is the
main goal. It is difficult to look at these findings and not think that the
private prison corporations’ desire to increase profits is a driving force
behind these bad conditions.
C. The Responses to Private Prisons
Due in part to these criticisms, an increasing number of states that
once used private prisons have started to roll back their reliance on
them.144 For example, New York has banned the use of private prisons
in its state since 2008.145 Other states, such as Nevada and Illinois,
have recently banned private prisons in some capacity as well,146 and
even more states, such as Colorado and Minnesota, have introduced
legislation to ban the use of private prisons in their states.147 However,
it is not just states taking action against the use of private prisons. U.S.
banks, which traditionally provided lines of credit to private prison
corporations, have announced that they will or have cut ties with private prison corporations.148 For example, well-known large banking
institutions such as JPMorgan Chase and Bank of America, among
others, have said that they would no longer provide lines of credit to
GEO Group.149 Many private prisons rely on debt financing for their
day-to-day operations, so having financial partnerships like the ones
GEO Group has lost is very important.150
140.
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.
147.
148.
149.
150.

Id. at 8–10.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 3.
Kim, supra note 5.
N.Y. CORRECT. LAW § 121 (McKinney 2021).
Kim, supra note 5.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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However, these are measures taken against private prisons by
only a handful of states and private companies. Things are very different at the federal level. When the Trump Administration came into
power in 2017, then-Attorney General Jeff Sessions rescinded the
2016 DOJ memo ordering the reduction of the federal government’s
reliance on private prisons.151 Jeff Sessions cited the federal government’s “future needs” of the federal correctional system as the primary
reason for the recission of the 2016 memo.152 Notably absent from this
memo was any discussion of the findings made in the 2016 DOJ report. Thus, despite the 2016 DOJ findings, Jeff Sessions allowed the
federal government to resume its contracts with private prisons, with
no recourse against the private prison corporations for the findings of
inadequate inmate care.
President Trump’s Administration didn’t stop there. By April
2017, the DOJ began requesting bids for contracts to house federal
inmates again, and that same month, GEO Group was awarded a $110
million contract to build a new detention center.153 All of this came
during a time when President Trump had significantly increased and
expanded the detention of immigrants in the country.154 Since 2007,
CoreCivic and GEO Group have been competing to take advantage of
the federal government’s growing reliance on privately-run immigration detention centers.155 Between 2000 and 2016, the number of immigrants housed in private prisons increased by 442 percent.156 In
2016, the federal government detained approximately 26,249 individuals in private detention centers.157 By 2017, over three-fourths of all
immigrant detainees were held in privately run immigration detention
centers.158 Also, the number of immigrants in private detention centers

151. Memorandum from Jefferson B. Sessions III, Att’y Gen., Off. of the Att’y Gen., to the
Acting Dir., Fed. Bureau of Prisons (Feb. 21, 2017), https://www.bop.gov/resources/news/pdfs/
20170224_doj_memo.pdf [https://perma.cc/P9RW-NDCH].
152. Id.
153. Hauwa Ahmed, How Private Prisons Are Profiting Under the Trump Administration, CTR.
FOR AM. PROGRESS (Aug. 30, 2019, 9:02 AM), https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/democracy/reports/2019/08/30/473966/private-prisons-profiting-trump-administration/
[https://perma.cc/6GPH-FUYX].
154. Id.
155. Madison Pauly, A Brief History of America’s Private Prison Industry, MOTHER JONES,
https://www.motherjones.com/politics/2016/06/history-of-americas-private-prison-industry-time
line/ [https://perma.cc/8ZR4-GUYP].
156. Ahmed, supra note 153.
157. Id.
158. Id.
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reached a record high of 55,185 in 2019.159 Reports also show that
despite needing funding for 52,000 beds, the Immigration Custody Enforcement agency only had funding for 45,000 detainees.160 Furthermore, the average amount of time immigrants spent in detention centers increased dramatically, going from twenty-eight to forty-six
days.161
D. Private Prisons Fight Back
Private prison corporations benefited significantly from President
Trump’s stance on immigration, but these corporations have made
other moves to combat the resistance against them. For example, a coalition of the largest private prison corporations backed an advocacy
group called Day 1 Alliance (D1A).162 The purpose of D1A, a public
information group, is to change the negative perception of private prisons.163 Yet, the group claims it does not plan on lobbying or advocating for issues.164 However, the group’s backers, the private prison corporations, have donated over $1 million to the Republican Party in
what can only be seen as an effort to keep in place the immigration
policies that create more profit for these corporations.165 In 2019
alone, GEO Group and CoreCivic made approximately $1.3 billion in
revenue from contracts with Immigration and Customs Enforcement.166 Some of these profits come from ten-year contracts that the
Trump Administration signed with these corporations for several private detention centers in Texas and California.167 GEO Group went as
far as to hold a company retreat at the Trump resort in Doral,

159. Isabela Dias, ICE Is Detaining More People Than Ever—And for Longer, PAC. STANDARD
(Aug. 1, 2019), https://psmag.com/news/ice-is-detaining-more-people-than-ever-and-for-longer
[https://perma.cc/RP7Y-QKHL].
160. Id.
161. Id.
162. Kim, supra note 5.
163. Id.
164. Id.
165. Vandana Rambaran, Private Prisons Bankrolling Trump Campaign as Election Looms,
FOX BUS. (Aug. 14, 2020), https://www.foxbusiness.com/politics/private-prisons-donate-largesums-to-trump-campaign [https://perma.cc/DD2G-4XAW].
166. Id.
167. Id.
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Florida.168 Thus, it should not be surprising that private prison corporations posted record earnings under the Trump Administration.169
With regard to funding, private prisons have mitigated the issue
of U.S. banks cutting ties with them by turning to overseas funding.170
For example, CoreCivic has turned to foreign institutions to help raise
money for the operation of its private prisons.171 An example of foreign aid reliance comes from a report that the Japanese investment
bank, Nomura, began reaching out to investors regarding a term loan
for CoreCivic.172 Thus, despite strong opposition from states and private companies in the United States, private prison corporations were
able to thrive under the Trump Administration due to the Administration’s immigration policies and decision to overlook all the negative
findings in the DOJ’s 2016 report.173 Other actions private prison corporations took to continue their growth include contracts that they
signed with the federal government to open four new private immigration detention centers, which took effect right before AB 32 took effect
in California.174
GEO Group and CoreCivic shares dropped in 2016 when Hillary
Clinton vowed to end government contracts with private prisons.175
This drop came at a time when the Obama Administration had already
ordered a substantial reduction on the federal government’s reliance
on private prisons.176 It seemed as if private prisons were nearing the
end of their run. Instead, private prison corporations have made over

168. Nomaan Merchant, Private Prison Industry Backs Trump, Prepares If Biden Wins, AP
NEWS (Aug. 13, 2020), https://apnews.com/article/houston-ap-top-news-prisons-immigration-joebiden-ca7f6e9fac1f287bb79ae55410112c46 [https://perma.cc/S57V-UYX9].
169. Sebastian Pellejero & Will Caiger-Smith, Private Prison Operator CoreCivic Finds New
Bankers as U.S. Lenders Pull Back, FORBES (Dec. 12, 2019, 10:00 AM), https://www.forbes.com/
sites/debtwire/2019/12/12/private-prison-operator-corecivic-finds-new-bankers-as-us-lenderspull-back/ [https://perma.cc/QHX6-82AW].
170. Id.
171. Id.
172. Id.
173. See Ahmed, supra note 153.
174. Rebecca Plevin, ICE Signs Long-Term Contracts Worth Billions for Private Detention
Centers, Dodging New State Law, DESERT SUN (Dec. 22, 2019, 9:01 AM), https://www.desertsun.com/story/news/2019/12/20/ice-signs-long-term-contracts-private-detention-centers-twoweeks-ahead-state-law/2713910001/ [https://perma.cc/M69S-2SKX].
175. Robert Ferris, Prison Stocks Are Flying on Trump Victory, CNBC (Nov. 11, 2016, 1:56
PM), https://www.cnbc.com/2016/11/09/prison-stocks-are-flying-on-trump-victory.html [https://
perma.cc/39LQ-DTUH].
176. Zapotosky & Harlan, supra note 138.
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a billion dollars in 2019 alone through the housing of immigrants in
private immigration detention centers.177
The aggressive tactics taken by the private prison corporations are
the exact reason why California needs to cut all ties with these corporations. With so many exceptions available to California’s prison ban,
these corporations will surely try to find loopholes to continue making
profit in California. Furthermore, even though California seems firm
in its opposition to private prisons today, the sudden shift in the federal
government’s stance on private prisons when President Trump was
elected and California’s history with harsh sentencing and prison overcrowding show that there is always a potential for resurgence. Therefore, it is critical to determine the scope of the exceptions listed in AB
32.
IV. INTERPRETING AB 32
AB 32 was passed with the intent of completely “abolishing” the
use of all private prisons in California.178 Assemblymember Bonta
stated that AB 32 “end[s] the use of for-profit, private prisons and detention facilities” in California.179 The Office of Governor Gavin
Newsom website stated that the purpose of AB 32 was to “eliminate
[private prisons] in California.”180 Moreover, both the legislature and
the governor claim that AB 32 “will phase out the use of all private,
for-profit prisons . . . in California.”181 Thus, it must be determined
whether these claims by Governor Newsom and the California Legislature are true.
A. What AB 32 Actually Says
1. Penal Code Sections 9501 & 9502
Section 9501 of the California Penal Code states the following:
“Except as otherwise provided in this title, a person shall not operate

177. See Rambaran, supra note 165.
178. S. RULES COMM., SENATE FLOOR ANALYSIS OF ASSEMBLY BILL NO. 32, 2019–2020 Reg.
Sess. (Cal. 2019).
179. Governor Newsom Signs AB 32, supra note 14.
180. Governor Newsom Takes Action on Legislation to Support California’s Immigrant and
Refugee Communities, OFF. OF GOVERNOR GAVIN NEWSOM (Sept. 27, 2020), https://www.gov.ca
.gov/2020/09/27/governor-newsom-takes-action-on-legislation-to-support-californias-immigrantand-refugee-communities/ [https://perma.cc/SA9H-7HDU].
181. Governor Newsom Signs AB 32, supra note 14.
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a private detention facility within the state.”182 The significant part of
section 9501 is the first half of the law. If California claims to be done
with private prisons, why are there exceptions? The exceptions are
listed under section 9502 of the Penal Code. Here is a list of all the
exceptions to California’s ban:
Section 9501 shall not apply to any of the following:
(a) Any facility providing rehabilitative, counseling, treatment, mental health, educational, or medical services to a juvenile that is under the jurisdiction of the juvenile court pursuant to Part 1 (commencing with Section 100) of Division 2
of the Welfare and Institutions Code.
(b) Any facility providing evaluation or treatment services to
a person who has been detained, or is subject to an order of
commitment by a court, pursuant to Section 1026, or pursuant to Division 5 (commencing with Section 5000) or Division 6 (commencing with Section 6000) of the Welfare and
Institutions Code.
(c) Any facility providing educational, vocational, medical,
or other ancillary services to an inmate in the custody of, and
under the direct supervision of, the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation or a county sheriff or other law enforcement agency.
(d) A residential care facility licensed pursuant to Division 2
(commencing with Section 1200) of the Health and Safety
Code.
(e) Any school facility used for the disciplinary detention of
a pupil.
(f) Any facility used for the quarantine or isolation of persons
for public health reasons pursuant to Division 105 (commencing with Section 120100) of the Health and Safety
Code.
(g) Any facility used for the temporary detention of a person
detained or arrested by a merchant, private security guard, or
other private person pursuant to Section 490.5 or 837.183
At first glance, this list appears to be alarming given how many
exceptions are listed towards AB 32. However, if the list is read
182. CAL. PENAL CODE § 9501 (West Supp. 2021).
183. Id. § 9502.
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carefully, most of these exceptions are actually covering situations in
which detainment by private non-prison companies could accidently
be interpreted as a violation of section 9501. Section 9502(g) illustrates this point well. This exception ensures that merchants who detain shoplifters in a facility in their stores are not deemed as acting in
violation of section 9501.184 Similarly, section 9502(e) applies to private schools that detain children for disciplinary purposes.185 Section
9502(f) covers health-related detainments of people in private facilities.186 Moreover, it is important to note that section 9501 says it applies towards private detention facilities, and while private prisons are
considered private detention facilities, not all private detention facilities are private prisons.187
2. Penal Code Section 9502(c) Exception
However, section 9502(c) appears to be much broader than the
other listed exceptions. This exception applies to “[a]ny facility” that
provides any one of a wide range of ancillary services to inmates that
are “in the custody of, and under the direct supervision of” the
CDCR.188 Section 9502(c) has raised concerns from advocates and
commentators as they believe it provides “glaring” “loopholes” that
allow private prisons to continue operating in California.189 This claim
is not necessarily meritless. After all, to be considered under the custody of the CDCR, it is not a requirement that you be housed at a state
public prison.190 All inmates of the state, even the ones detained in
private prisons, are under the custody of the CDCR.191
Furthermore, the language requiring prisoners to be under “the
direct supervision of” the CDCR is not dispositive either. After all,
there are many ways to achieve direct supervision of inmates without
housing them in public prisons. For example, couldn’t the CDCR
simply staff one or even a few employees at a private prison to serve
in a supervisory role over the housing of inmates in the private prison?
184.
185.
186.
187.
188.
189.
190.

Id. § 9502(g).
Id. § 9502(e).
Id. § 9502(f).
Id. § 9501.
Id. § 9502(c).
Lyon, supra note 15.
CAL. DEP’T OF CORR. & REHAB. ADULT INSTITUTIONS, PROGRAMS, & PAROLE,
OPERATIONS MANUAL 11 (Jan. 1, 2020), https://www.cdcr.ca.gov/regulations/wp-content/uploads
/sites/171/2020/03/2020-DOM-02.27.20.pdf [https://perma.cc/7NEE-3DQH].
191. Id.
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This action appears to satisfy the requirement of having direct supervision over inmates. It is difficult to say for sure how this exception
would be interpreted given that there are no guidelines or comments
as to how these exceptions work or what private detention facilities
they apply to. As noted above, section 9502(c) does appear in a list
full of exceptions that address the issue of mislabeling other forms of
detainment as a violation of section 9501, but the legislature did not
say that this was the sole purpose of section 9502. Therefore, when
you combine the lack of explicit legislative intent in enacting section
9502 with the fact that section 9502(c)’s language is so broad, it could
be argued that section 9502(c) is an exception to the ban of private
prisons in California.
3. Penal Code Section 5003.1(e) Exception
Although the focus of this Note will be on section 9502(c), it
should also be noted that there is another exception to AB 32’s claimed
private prison ban. This exception is in section 5003.1(e) of the California Penal Code, which states that the CDCR “may renew or extend
a contract with a private, for-profit prison facility to provide housing
for state prison inmates in order to comply with the requirements of
any court-ordered population cap.”192 This is a live exception to the
private prison ban because, since 2017, California has been just below
the federal mandate of operating at 137.5 percent capacity.193 Thus,
any spikes in crime, like the one Los Angeles County is currently experiencing,194 could cause future reliance on private prisons. Even
though Los Angeles County is seeing progressive reforms in prosecution,195 there is still strong resistance to the criminal justice reform,
which could lead to rises in incarceration rates due to the higher crime
rates.
Therefore, section 5003.1(e) could also serve as a way to argue
that section 9502(c) applies to private prisons. The argument would be
192. CAL. PENAL CODE § 5003.1(e).
193. Heather Harris et al., California’s Prison Population, PUB. POL’Y INST. OF CAL.
(July 2019), https://www.ppic.org/publication/californias-prison-population [https://perma.cc/W6
MX-RSWD].
194. Jon Regardie, With 48 Murders, Los Angeles Sees Deadliest Month in More Than a Decade, CROSSTOWN (Aug. 11, 2021), https://xtown.la/2021/08/11/high-murders-los-angeles/
[https://perma.cc/8ENG-FUZL].
195. Jaclyn Diaz, Judge Blocks LA District Attorney’s Reforms, NPR (Feb. 9, 2021, 4:17 AM),
https://www.npr.org/2021/02/09/965673109/judge-blocks-l-a-district-attorneys-reforms
[https://perma.cc/WDJ8-ZJMM].
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that section 5003.1(e) is direct proof that AB 32 is not a complete private prison ban, which means that private prisons should be encompassed in section 9502(c) since there is no language to even suggest
that this exception was not intended to apply to private prisons.
4. Penal Code Section 5003.1(c)
It is important to note that section 5003.1 also contains a provision that states that “[a]fter January 1, 2028, a state prison inmate or
other person under the jurisdiction of the [CDCR] shall not be incarcerated in a private, for-profit prison facility.”196 On its own, this provision seems to put an end to this discussion all together. After all, the
language is straightforward in its application. However, how does section 9502 interact with section 5003.1? Section 9502(c) says that
“[a]ny facility” can operate for purposes of providing a wide range of
services to inmates in the care of the CDCR.197 Private prisons clearly
fall under the umbrella of any facility. If this is how the legislature
chose to define what facilities are exempt from section 9501, then “any
facility” could include for-profit private prisons. Section 5003.1 appears to be setting a deadline for when all prisoners currently in private
prisons must be transferred to public prisons. However, it doesn’t appear to override the continued use of the exceptions in section 9502.
This assertion is confirmed in the Senate Rules Committee report
on AB 32. That committee’s report says that it “[p]rovides that the
prohibition of the operation of a for-profit detention facility within the
state does not apply to facilities that are primarily engaged in specified
services such as” all the exceptions in section 9502.198 The choice of
the words “operation of a for-profit detention facility” in its plain
meaning encompasses for-profit prisons. However, as discussed
above, most of these exceptions appear to apply to private companies
that are not private prisons, but that could accidentally be held as violating section 9501 because they are private companies that happen to
detain certain individuals under certain circumstances. Furthermore,
the digest in the Senate Rules Committee report states the following:
“[t]his bill abolishes, in line with California’s interest in ensuring the
safety and welfare of its residents, the private for-profit prison industry

196. CAL. PENAL CODE § 5003.1(c).
197. Id. § 9502(c).
198. S. RULES COMM., supra note 178.
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from our state in order to protect incarcerated individuals from serious
harm within our state border.”199
Thus, the only remaining critical question to ask is whether section 9502(c) can be read broadly enough to encompass private prisons
in the exception of private detention facilities offering ancillary services to inmates. This will be critical in assessing the effectiveness of
a law that the legislature claims to be a ban and for the assessment of
the response by a legislature that has declared the following:
These for-profit run private prison companies benefit from
incarcerating Californians and have no incentive to invest in
their rehabilitation or mental and physical health. For-profit
prison companies owe a fiduciary duty to their shareholders.
Their mission is to maximize profits for their investors. They
are able to accomplish this by increasing their inmate population and cutting operational costs, which is dangerous and
detrimental to the Californians who are held against their
will. Every dollar spent in treating their prisoners and detainees in a way that promotes the health and welfare of the prisoners and detainees is a dollar less in profit for shareholders.200
With all of this in mind, the next step is to figure out how courts
will grapple with the issue of interpreting AB 32 should the issue arise.
B. Methods of Interpretation
Interpreting section 9502(c) turns on the answer to the following
question: how broadly will courts interpret the language that the legislature chose to use in section 9502(c)? Answering this question will
involve some discussion of statutory interpretation techniques. Realistically, there are many statutory techniques that could apply, and depending on the ones used, different results would be obtained on how
broadly these exceptions would apply. However, practically speaking,
there are only two results that are important from a judicial interpretation of AB 32, given the fact that it is supposed to be a ban on the use
of private prisons. Either the exceptions will be read broadly, and AB
32 will not accomplish the goal of the governor and legislature, or the
exceptions, in line with the legislative intent, will be interpreted as exceptions applying to private companies that are not private prisons.
199. Id.
200. Id.
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Although there definitely are middle-ground approaches to how
broadly the exceptions are interpreted, anything but the strictest interpretation of AB 32’s exceptions will necessarily defeat the purported
claim that AB 32 is an actual private prison ban. Thus, this Note need
only discuss two statutory interpretation techniques; one that leads to
a broad judicial interpretation of the exceptions and one that leads to
a strict interpretation of AB 32’s exceptions. A statutory interpretation
technique that would likely lead to a broad reading of section 9502(c)
is the Plain Meaning Rule. Another technique for statutory interpretation is legislative history, which would likely lead to a narrow reading
of section 9502(c).
1. The Plain Meaning Rule
The Plain Meaning Rule of statutory interpretation is simply the
idea that statutory language on its own dictates the meaning of a law
enacted by the legislature.201 Under this approach, external evidence
such as statutory purpose or legislative intent and history is not ordinarily considered.202 The only exception for considering extrinsic evidence is when the statute’s text is unclear or ambiguous.203 Thus, if
the text of a statute is unambiguous in its meaning, the meaning that
the text conveys will be enforced even if the result goes against the
legislative intent of the legislature.204
2. Broad Interpretation of Section 9502(c)
Under the Plain Meaning Rule, the result from litigation over the
reach of section 9502(c) would be that the section 9502(c) exception
applies to private prisons. This would be the case because the legislature chose the words “[a]ny facility” to describe which kind of facilities are exempt from the section 9501 ban.205 Therefore, it must necessarily be true that private prisons are included in the exemption. This
is because private prisons clearly fall under the category of “any facility.” If section 9502(c) was truly meant to exempt any private detention facility except private prisons, it would have explicitly stated so.

201. The Supreme Court, 1991 Term—Leading Cases, 106 HARV. L. REV. 163, 374 n.54
(1992).
202. Id.
203. William Baude & Ryan D. Doerfler, The (Not So) Plain Meaning Rule, 84 U. CHI. L. REV.
539, 540 (2017).
204. See id. at 543.
205. CAL. PENAL CODE § 9502(c) (West Supp. 2021).
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Moreover, if section 9502 was only intended to ensure that other private facilities were not accidentally under the purview of section 9501,
then the legislature would have had to state that this was the purpose
of section 9502(c).
As for the “inmate in the custody of, and under the direct supervision of, the [CDCR]” language,206 the ordinary use of the words are
applied in the interpretation. Thus, it must be determined what it
means to be “under the direct supervision of.” This portion of the statute could cause judges to turn to the legislative history, as it is not clear
what it means to be “under the direct supervision” of someone. However, looking into how the words “direct supervision” are used in other
settings could clear up any ambiguities without having to dive into the
legislative history. For example, employees typically have supervisors
who ensure they are doing their work properly, which is a form of
direct supervision. At school, students typically have supervisors who
are directly supervising over the safety of the students. Thus, when
considering how direct supervision is used in these other settings, it
appears that private prisons could be allowed to operate under section
9502(c) if CDCR staff members serve in a supervisory capacity in private prisons to ensure that the private prison staff are doing their jobs
adequately, similar to a supervisor in a job or school setting.
Although, even if interpreted under this rule, there is still room to
argue for the limited use of AB 32’s exceptions. Under section
9502(c), it could be argued that the facilities exempt from the ban must
be offering services to all the inmates in its care. The argument would
be that including the language that inmates in these detention centers
must be receiving some kind of service means that if the inmates are
not receiving such services, those in the latter group could not be
housed in private detention centers. This would mean that private prisons could not simply offer services that are only available to a fraction
of its inmate population as a method to house many more who do not
have access to such services. However, even this limitation in the interpretation of section 9502(c) can be wide-reaching. The statute does
not define what “other ancillary services” means. Furthermore, it does
not seem outside the realm of possibility for private prisons to set up
a system in which all their inmates receive the bare minimum of the
listed services, say for example, all inmates receive educational

206. Id.
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services in the form of a thirty-minute class, to qualify many individuals under this exception.
The issue is that these services that exempt private prisons under
section 9502(c) are not well defined. Section 9502(c) does not have
guidelines or requirements for what quality of services would qualify
a private prison for an exemption. For example, does offering the previously mentioned half-hour classes to all inmates exempt private prisons from section 9501 under section 9502(c)? A reading of the plain
language used in section 9502(c) would seem to suggest the answer is
yes. What about the “other ancillary services” portion of the exemption? Does offering anger management or rehabilitation programs
once a month for thirty minutes to each inmate count as a service under
section 9502(c)? Again, without any guidance, the literal answer when
reading the language in 9502(c) would be yes, since under the Plain
Meaning Rule, the private prison is offering one of the services listed
under it, and because the law does not set out requirements for the
quality or length of time that the services need to last.
Overall, at best, AB 32 is conflicting because it is held out as a
rebuke against private prisons, yet the language used, if read under the
Plain Meaning Rule, creates such broad exceptions. Under the Plain
Meaning Rule, situations like this are decided in favor of what the text
says because the text is clear as to who is exempt, which is any facility.
Furthermore, it is clear what the facilities have to do to be exempt–
offer ancillary services to inmates.207 Finally, direct supervision by the
CDCR can be interpreted as non-ambiguous. Overall, a plain reading
of section 9502(c) would lead to the result that so long as a private
prison offers any level of services to an inmate, which includes the
bare minimum since the statute does not define the level of services it
requires, then that private prison will be exempt under section 9502(c).
Interpretations such as these are not only possible, but they are also
probable.
The California Supreme Court has emphasized the use of the
Plain Meaning Rule in landmark cases. In Doe v. City of Los Angeles,208 the court stated that it would “follow the Legislature’s intent, as
exhibited by the plain meaning of the actual words of the law.”209
Thus, even if one wanted to argue that the legislature intended to ban
207. Id.
208. 169 P.3d 559 (Cal. 2007).
209. Id. at 566 (quoting Cal. Tchrs. Ass’n v. Governing Bd. of Rialto Unified Sch. Dist., 927
P.2d 1175, 1177 (Cal. 1997)).
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private prisons and that the use of the exceptions should not apply to
private prisons, the language in section 9502, particularly section
9502(c), can easily be construed to show why such a narrow interpretation of the exceptions was not intended, regardless of what any legislators said in a different setting. It will not matter what individual
legislators or the governor claim their intent is; what will matter is the
language they actually chose to use. Although, it should be noted that
Doe does discuss legislative history being used to confirm the meaning
of the statute.210 However, the issue here is that an examination of the
legislative history reveals absolutely nothing about what facilities the
legislature was trying to exempt with any of the exceptions under section 9502.211
This exact principle has already been used by other courts in California as well. For example, in People v. Goodliffe212 the prosecutor
attempted to argue that despite the language used in a sex offense statute that prevented the defendant from receiving consecutive terms for
each of his offenses, the defendant should nonetheless be sentenced
with consecutive terms because it was the intent of the voters to increase the punishment of sex offenders.213 However, the court disagreed with this notion and applied the Plain Meaning Rule, holding
that general statements of voter intent cannot trump the plain meaning
of the statute as defined by the words the statute actually uses.214 The
court only identified two exceptions: (1) words in a statute will not be
followed when it appears clear that it has been erroneously used; and
(2) words or meaning of a statute will not be followed where a literal
reading would achieve absurd consequences.215
Applying this reasoning to section 9502, even though the legislature stated that its intent was to ban private prisons, that general statement will not trump the language in section 9502. Instead, it will be
argued that the inclusion of exceptions in AB 32 shows that the legislature intended to have avenues for the continued use of private prisons. Furthermore, reading the exceptions broadly, which section
9502(c)’s language supports, would not lead to any absurd results
since section 9502 was intended to be a list of exceptions to section
210.
211.
212.
213.
214.
215.

Id. at 566–67.
See S. RULES COMM., supra note 178.
99 Cal. Rptr. 3d 385 (Ct. App. 2009).
Id. at 388–89.
Id. at 389–90.
Id. at 388.
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9501. In addition, there is no evidence that any of the words used in
section 9502 are erroneous.
Thus, there are statutory interpretation techniques that courts
could potentially use to make exceptions like section 9502(c) live.
Given how private prison companies have been quick to exploit other
opportunities to remain active, such as increasing their involvement in
the detainment of people in ICE’s custody, it is not difficult to imagine
private prisons exploiting section 9502(c) by arguing for this broad
interpretation.
3. Legislative History
However, judges have many statutory techniques at their disposal, and they have full discretion to choose which techniques they
do and do not apply in a particular case. Thus, a court interpreting
section 9502(c) could choose to use the statutory technique of legislative history. Legislative history is a term that refers to the documents
that are produced as a legislative body introduced, studied, and debated.216 One of the most important sets of documents in the legislative
history of a bill are the committee reports.217 This is because these
documents tend to have the most analysis regarding the bill that is set
to be passed.218 Committee reports typically include the purpose of a
bill, its history, and the reasoning for why certain language is chosen.219 Thus, mining the legislative history can provide a great deal of
information and insight as to how a legislature would expect or intend
for a statute to be interpreted.220
4. Narrow Interpretation of Section 9502(c)
Under the legislative history approach, courts interpreting AB
32’s exception will likely hold that section 9502(c) does not apply to
private prisons. The argument would be that section 9502(c)’s language in the exception applying to inmates “under the direct supervision of” the CDCR means that the inmates receiving the ancillary services must be housed in public prisons. Thus, private prisons are
216. Legislative History Research Guide: Overview, GEO. L. LIBR., https://guides.ll.george
town.edu/legislative_history [https://perma.cc/8D65-9F7A] (last updated June 24, 2021, 1:31 PM).
217. Id.
218. Id.
219. Legislative History Research Guide: Reports, GEO. L. LIBR., https://guides.ll.georgetown
.edu/c.php?g=278869&p=1862825 [https://perma.cc/3MPW-3PFE] (last updated Dec. 8, 2021,
11:21 AM).
220. Id.
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inherently disqualified from falling under the purview of section
9502(c). Such a ruling would be backed by the legislative history on
AB 32, such as the findings made on private prisons by the Senate
Judiciary Committee, which includes the following:
Their fiduciary duty, as a for-profit corporation, and mission
is to maximize profits for their investors. They are able to
accomplish this by increasing their inmate population and
cutting operational costs, which is dangerous and detrimental
to the prisoners and staff. Private prison corporations have
incentives to drive up reliance on incarceration, often lobbying to drive up policies which increase incarceration in order
to drive up demand for their business. This presents a concerning conflict of interest with the state’s goals to invest in
the rehabilitation and reintegration of people.221
This language is powerful in that it serves as a strong showing to
the court for why section 9502(c) was not intended by the legislature
to apply to private prisons, which is why the language “under the direct supervision, of the CDCR” was selected.
There is precedent for this technique in California. The California
Supreme Court has stated that California courts rely on legislative history in “determining whether the literal meaning of a statute comports
with its purpose.”222 In fact, this reasoning was used as justification to
use legislative history despite an argument that the Plain Meaning
Rule applied to the statute in dispute.223 The court further stated that
“[l]iteral construction should not prevail if it is contrary to the legislative intent apparent in the statute. The intent prevails over the letter,
and the letter will, if possible, be so read as to conform to the spirit of
the act.”224 Additionally, at least one California court has used legislative intent to counter other statutory interpretation rules that would
normally apply in a given situation.225
Applying this case law precedent here, the argument would be
that interpreting section 9502(c) to include private prisons would run
completely contrary to the explicit intent stated by both the legislature
and the governor. Therefore, because AB 32 was passed with the intent
221. S. JUDICIARY COMM., ANALYSIS OF ASSEMBLY BILL NO. 32, 2019–2020 Reg. Sess. 6
(Cal. 2019) (hearing July 2, 2019).
222. Lungren v. Deukmejian, 755 P.2d 299, 304 (Cal. 1988).
223. Id. at 303–04.
224. Id. at 304.
225. Peoples v. San Diego Unified Sch. Dist., 41 Cal. Rptr. 3d 383, 388–89 (Ct. App. 2006).
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of banning private prisons because the legislature believes that private
prisons cannot be trusted to provide the very services section 9502(c)
exempts, it can be persuasively argued that private prisons are not a
part of section 9502(c). This argument would not be difficult to make
given the language that the Senate Judiciary Committee used to describe private prisons and the statements made that the intent of AB
32 is to completely ban the use of private prisons.
5. What Will the Courts Actually Hold?
While the language of section 9502(c) is not written as clearly as
it could be, the legislative history is a very compelling reason to conclude that the exception would not be interpreted broadly enough to
encompass private prisons. Aside from the live exception in section
5003.1(e), California’s politicians have sent a strong message through
legislative action. It is likely that the concerns by commentators as to
the “loopholes” in section 9502(c) will not be an issue. Section
9502(c) is the only exception that is broad enough to potentially allow
for the use of private prisons. Yet, despite it not directly stating that
private prisons are not part of this exception, it is likely that the language “under the direct supervision of[] the [CDCR]” will be interpreted to mean that these inmates must be housed in public prisons.226
It cannot be denied that there is a bit of ambiguity in section 9502(c).
However, the intent behind the passing of AB 32 is very clear and any
courts interpreting section 9502 will likely take note of this.
The California Supreme Court has used the Plain Meaning Rule.
However, the court has also made it clear that in the court’s view, the
Plain Meaning Rule cannot be used as justification for reaching a holding that runs contrary to the purpose of the legislation.227 Here, it is
clear that the legislature’s purpose is to ban private prisons from operating in California.
V. DISCUSSING THE PRIVATE PRISON BAN
A. A Complete Ban Is Necessary
California politicians have advertised to be done with the forprofit prison industry with the passing of AB 32.228 More generally,
226. CAL. PENAL CODE § 9502(c) (West Supp. 2021).
227. Lungren, 755 P.2d at 304.
228. Governor Newsom Signs AB 32, supra note 14.
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the state seems to be done with prison profiteers due to the incentives
these companies have to promote policies that keep individuals incarcerated.229 These tactics, of course, disproportionately affect minorities who are the majority of inmates.230 The executive summary in the
Senate Judiciary Committee report states that AB 32 was passed with
the intent to “protect vulnerable individuals” from exploitation from
private prisons.231 That summary also states that “[t]hese for-profit run
private prison companies benefit from incarcerating Californians and
have no incentive to invest in their rehabilitation or mental and physical health.”232 The summary further states that “[t]here are numerous
documented abuses of people held in for-profit run prison facilities in
California.”233 Comments made in the Senate Judiciary Committee
Report by advocates of AB 32 state that private prisons lobby “to drive
up policies which increase incarceration in order to drive up demand
for their business.”234
For some reason, many politicians claim to be thoroughly against
private prisons but only take minor stances against them. Take, for
example, the executive order that President Biden signed directing the
DOJ to cease reliance on private prisons for people in federal custody.235 Notably, despite claiming to end private prison use, this executive order does not cease the detainment of individuals in private prisons if they are under the custody of ICE.236 This is a glaring omission
given the fact that only approximately 27,400, or 16 percent, of inmates under the custody of the DOJ are in private prisons when compared to the 75 percent of individuals being held in privately-run immigrant prisons.237 In 2019, ICE had approximately 50,000 people in
detention centers each day.238 This means approximately 35,000 or
more of these inmates were in privately-run immigrant prisons, which
also suffer from poor conditions and inadequate staffing.239
229. S. JUDICIARY COMM., supra note 221, at 1.
230. See Madeleine Severin, Note, Is There a Winning Argument Against Excessive Rates for
Collect Calls from Prisoners?, 25 CARDOZO L. REV. 1469, 1522 (2004).
231. S. JUDICIARY COMM., supra note 221, at 1.
232. Id.
233. Id.
234. Id. at 6.
235. Madeline Carlisle, ‘Much More Work to be Done.’ Advocates Call for More Action
Against Private Prisons After Biden’s ‘First Step’ Executive Order, TIME (Jan. 29, 2021, 3:32 PM),
https://time.com/5934213/private-prisons-ban-joe-biden/.
236. Id.
237. Id.
238. Id.
239. Id.
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This is why California did well in taking a hard stance against
private prisons in AB 32. Admittedly, the exceptions in AB 32 are
difficult to define in scope and potentially leave room for private prisons to continue to operate. Therefore, courts interpreting this statute
must do so with legislative intent in mind. The legislature was accurate
in noting that these for-profit private prisons have a duty to maximize
shareholder profits; many commentators have provided sufficient evidence to show this is true.240 They do not have a duty to provide
proper housing or health and recidivism services to the inmates they
care for.241 Thus, section 9502(c), an exception regarding these exact
services, should not be read to allow for private prisons that offer these
services to continue operating.
While this issue is not likely to arise anytime soon, no one can
know how California will think of these issues five, ten, or even
twenty years from now. Thus, the state’s current commitment to banning the use of private prisons must be read as such to ensure that
down the line, should the state’s mindset change, there is no room for
exploitation through the exceptions in section 9502. While some people may think that California could never turn back, California’s previous history of defining prison sentences as solely about punishment
is a glaring reminder that if the state has gone down this path once,
there is no way to know for sure that at some point many years from
now the state will not revert to this mindset.
B. Financial Savings Is Not Justification to Keep Private Prisons
Private prisons serve the exact same function as public prisons.
The only beneficial reasons to give this duty to private companies
would be for better results or for financial savings. Thus, some people
may argue that private prison use should continue in California due to
the costs-saving benefits associated with them, particularly during a
fractured economy caused by the Covid-19 pandemic. This assertion
can be backed by the legislative history, which shows that the costs
for a complete ban on private prisons is unknown but could be as high
as $133.9 million.242 However, the Senate Judiciary Committee report
does contain counterclaims offered by advocacy groups, which state
that: “AB 32 will also save taxpayers tens, if not hundreds of millions
240. S. RULES COMM., supra note 178, at 4, 11.
241. Id.
242. Id. at 6.
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by concluding these contracts. For-profit prisons have been paid billions over the last decade, but have failed to result in the expected costsavings for California taxpayers when government services are ‘contracted-out.’”243 These savings are likely to be materialized through
lower recidivism rates because state prisons will be incentivized to offer the most effective rehabilitative and educational programs since
they do not have to balance this interest against the shareholders’ profits. The effect of this should be effective programming for inmates.
The more significant effect of lower recidivism rates is that less people
in our society will become victims of crime, which itself can have high
costs to society attached to the victimization.
Furthermore, at best, the evidence on whether private prisons are
truly more cost-efficient than public prisons is conflicting.244 Moreover, the majority of expenses associated with AB 32 are likely linked
to one-time expenses regarding the transfer of inmates and setting up
state-run facilities to house the inmates. It is unclear how much of the
expected expenses, if any, are linked to higher costs in publicly run
state prisons. However, any savings, if they exist, are not worth the
tradeoff of having inmates in facilities where their health, rehabilitation, and safety are second to profits. Overall, regardless of any financial motivations, this cannot serve as a reason to tolerate the significant
hardships and subpar living standards inmates face in private prisons.
C. Keeping AB 32 in Perspective
It is also important to put this reform into perspective. While California has done well in banning private prison use, this is simply not
enough to end the exploitation of our state’s inmates. Private prisons
are not the only way private for-profit companies profit from the incarceration of inmates. Take, for example, the phone service providers
in public prisons, which are for-profit private companies that take in
$1.2 billion annually in revenue.245 For-profit private commissaries
take in $1.6 billion annually for their services.246 Notably, California
collects a commission from these sales.247 This means that California
itself is directly profiting from the incarceration of its inmates in public

243.
244.
245.
246.
247.

S. JUDICIARY COMM., supra note 221, at 6.
Friedmann, supra note 114, at 505.
Bozelko & Lo, supra note 15.
Id.
Id.
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prisons, which is the very act that they condemned private prisons for
committing.248
In at least one jail in California, inmates must pay twelve dollars
just to speak to their loved ones for fifteen minutes.249 This is alarming
because, for many families, this only adds to the burdens associated
with having a family member incarcerated. For many families, phone
services are the only way to communicate with family members because prisons are often located in remote towns that are too far for
families to travel to.250 In addition, letters are not a good substitute for
many families due to issues regarding literacy.251 Another issue with
letters is that they are not a feasible way to develop or maintain relationships with young children in their family.252 Thus, private forprofit companies are profiteering at the expense of the burden families
go through to pay for the fees to call their loved ones. Furthermore,
this system sets up barriers for family members who are unable to
speak to their imprisoned loved ones due to their inability to pay the
high phone rates that these for-profit companies charge.
To make matters even worse, there are no persuasive justifications that private for-profit companies can provide in defense of this
system.253 Thus, California looks even worse because it is taking commission from a system that places a burden on low-income families
and blocks access to communication for many of these families, all in
the name of profit for private companies. Defenses raised for continuing the current phone service system revolve around the “great expenses associated with prisons.”254 However, this justification is unpersuasive because it is other aspects of running prisons that are costly
when compared to phone services.255 Moreover, if this was an issue,
then the profit made from these services should be going towards the
operation of the prisons, and not in the hands of the shareholders.
California should not be participating in systems that allow private vendors to make profit from inmates in public prisons. Such exploitation of inmates places an additional burden on the inmate’s
248. S. RULES COMM., supra note 178, at 4.
249. Regulating the Prison Phone Industry, PRISON POL’Y INITIATIVE, https://www.prisonpol
icy.org/phones/ [https://perma.cc/9DRD-QPZX].
250. Severin, supra note 230, at 1474.
251. Id. at 1474–75.
252. Id.
253. Id. at 1475.
254. Id. at 1475–76.
255. Id. at 1476–77.
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family and is contradictory to the goals of protecting vulnerable inmates from financial exploitation by private for-profit companies,
which is the very reasoning given for the passing of AB 32. It should
be no different with other services, such as phone services, just because California gets a commission from these sales. For these reasons, California must now take the next step and ban all private forprofit vendors from operating in California’s prison system. This next
step will help California end the profiteering by private companies on
California’s prison system. This is how California will truly reach its
goal of protecting California residents from the exploitation of private
for-profit companies.
VI. CONCLUSION
California has taken a real stance against private prisons. Private
prisons profit from the incarceration of inmates at the expense of the
health and safety of the very inmates they house. The exceptions in
AB 32, notably section 9502(c), will likely not apply to private prisons, so the concerns raised by commentators that AB 32 has loopholes
for private prisons are not an issue. However, it is important to continue to push the California Legislature to act further on this issue. The
financial exploitation of our state’s inmates goes far beyond housing
them in private prisons. The state must now turn to banning for-profit
companies from profiteering as vendors in public prisons offering services such as phone services, which is also an exploitation of inmates
that burdens them and their family members. Therefore, AB 32 must
be expanded to encompass for-profit companies acting as vendors in
our public prisons. There is no reason that these companies should
have the ability to create billion-dollar industries at the expense of
California’s incarcerated population.
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